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ABSTRACT
A study was conducted on issues related to the introduction and trading of
Kuala Lumpur Composite Index futures contract in Malaysia. Issues related
to volatility, expiration day effect and pricing efficiency were examined. The
test (using Levene test) indicated that a decrease in volatility was observed
after the futures trading. Most stocks show a significant decrease in volatility
in the post-futures period than their non-KLCI components. These noted
changes were not uniform and were dependent upon individual stocks and
industry sectors. It might be due to the existence of futures market which led
to a stability effect by increasing information flow and market liquidity, as
well as by reducing market risk by providing hedging opportunities. It is
concluded that futures volatility is significantly higher, especially where
there are big price movements of the underlying assets. No evidence of any
expiration day effect was found. The test of mispricing shows frequent
underpricing than overpricing. If transaction costs is included, it shows very
little mispricing.
ABSTRAK
Satu kajian telah dilakukan ke atas isu yang berkait dengan pengenalan dan
urusniaga niagaan ke depan indeks komposit Kuala Lumpur di Malaysia.
Kajian ini melibatkan isu kemeruapan, kesan hari perlupusan dan kecekapan
harga.  Ujian (dengan menggunakan ujian Levene) menunjukkan terdapat
perbezaan dalam kemeruapan selepas permulaan urusniaga pasaran niagaan
ke depan.  Kebanyakan saham  komponen indeks komposit menunjukkan
penurunan yang besar dalam kemeruapan selepas wujudnya pasaran niagaan
ke depan berbanding  dengan saham-saham  lain.  Perubahan  ini tidaklah
seragam tetapi bergantung kepada saham individu dan sektor industrinya.
Ini berkemungkinan akibat daripada kewujudan pasaran niagaan ke depan
yang memberi kestabilan harga dengan cara meningkatkan aliran maklumat
dan kecairan pasaran, di samping mengurangan risiko pasaran  dengan
mewujudkan peluang lindungan nilai.  Kajian ini juga membawa kesimpulan
bahawa kemeruapan pasaran niagaan ke depan adalah nyata lebih tinggi
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apabila berlaku pergerakan harga yang besar pada aset asas.  Kajian juga
mendapati tiada kesan hari perlupusan.  Ujian kecekapan harga menunjukkan
terkurang harga lebih kerap berbanding dengan terlebih harga.  Jika kos
urusniaga dimasuk kira, terlebih dan terkurangnya harga adalah kecil.
INTRODUCTION
Several studies have examined the impact of futures trading on the underlying
assets and many of them provide conflicting arguments for that effect. The
transaction costs in futures market are in fact lower than those in the spot
market. Futures market also allows arbitraging and hedging opportunities
and it might attract additional traders to the market. Therefore, conventional
wisdom suggests, futures trading should bring more traders to the spot
market and make it more liquid and less volatile. However, some literature
view that futures market brings in uninformed speculators, who then trade
in the spot market as well as futures market to increase volatility (Edward
1988).
In the early 1980s, almost the entire volume of futures trading transacted
was concentrated in the United States. However, by the mid 1980s, the
situation was vastly different, with a host of new exchanges operating
throughout Europe, South America and the Asia Pacific region. Today
futures is a global industry with more than 60 exchanges operating world-
wide.
Derivative securities in general and index futures and options in particular
have been blamed for stock market crash of October, 1987 and the mini
crash of 1989, and some recent highly publicized financial disasters have
created the impression that derivatives threaten the stability of the international
financial system. The huge losses of Procter and Gamble, Orange County
Metallgesellschaft and the Barings have created a great deal of controversy.
Consequently, tighter regulation and supervision are heard with higher
frequency. On the other hand, as reported in “Starting Out in Futures
Trading” by Randall, Fortenbery and Hector (1997), they have identified
four social benefits of futures trading. These include:
1. competitive price discovery,
2. hedging (or management) of industry price risks,
3. facilitation of financing, and
4. more efficient resource allocation.
In today’s business environment, Malaysia faces the challenge of keeping
up with greater economic and financial interdependence among nations.
Exposure from economic globalization creates a greater need for Malaysia
to have risk management tools to cope with the increasing volatility of
financial assets and investment instruments. This need, combined with
Malaysia’s ambition to promote itself as a regional financial center in the
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Asia Pacific region has led to the development of the Kuala Lumpur Options
and Financial Futures Exchange “KLOFFE” in the early 1990s. The legal
framework was completed in 1993 to bring into existence a well regulated,
financially sound and credible derivatives industry.
15th December 1995, the birth of KLOFFE heralded a significant event
in the development of the nation’s capital market with the launch of
KLOFFE’s KLCI futures contract. With its introduction, Malaysia became the
third Asian economy after Hong Kong and Japan to offer domestic equity
derivatives products.
As in the case of major stock index futures contracts in the U.S., such
as the S&P 500 contract traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the
settlement prices of the Malaysian contracts are determined 15 minutes after
the close of trading in the underlying stocks. KLOFFE is a fully electronic
exchange which operates an integrated trading and clearing. Its fully
automated system will ensure transparency and fairness in that all traders
will have access to the same information set. It will also help minimize
manual efforts which in turn reduces cost in the long run.
The objective of this study is to measure and analyze the several issues
related to the introduction and trading of KLCI futures. The issues being (i)
issues related to volatility of the futures and underlying (ii) expiration day
effect of the underlying (iii) pricing efficiency of the futures. This paper also
analysed a number of minor issues that may be related to the above main
research questions.
In Malaysia, there are very few studies which have explicitly studied
any aspects of the KLCI futures market (see Ibrahim, Othman and Bacha
(1999). In contrast, there have been various studies on developed countries’
futures market. Therefore, as also cited by Ibrahim, Othman and Bacha
(1999), besides the need to understand these issues for future policy making,
it will be interesting to examine the impact of index futures introduction in
a market at a lower stage of development, with incomplete markets and no
short selling. In fact this study extends the study by  Ibrahim, Othman and
Bacha (1999) which covered the period until December 1997.
The complexity of risk and returns in financial market has increased
dramatically with the advent of global markets and the pace of financial
innovation. Therefore, volatility in financial markets has become an important
research topic. Besides, the public perception of increases in risk in the
financial markets and derivatives securities in particular provides substantial
motivation for research in these markets.
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This section provides an overview of existing literature relevant to the
research questions mentioned in the previous section.
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  IMPACT OF FUTURES INTRODUCTION ON UNDERLYING
STOCK MARKET VOLATILITY
Stock market volatility refers to the variability of stock prices. An increase
in stock market volatility brings an increased chance of large stock price
changes of either sign. For supporters of market efficiency, volatility reflects
the incorporation of new information. However, those with less confidence
in market efficiency view volatility as a measure of speculative excess in the
market as reported by Cutler  et al. (1989).
The impact of index futures introduction on underlying stock market
volatility is well researched and documented; especially in the case of US,
UK, Japan and Hong Kong. There is little agreement as to the effect of
futures contracts have on the underlying market. In the most recent of such
studies, Pericli and Koutman (1997) examine S&P 500’s returns over the
period of 1953 to September 1994. They find no incremental effect on
underlying market volatility as a result of the introduction of index futures
nor options. This confirmed the findings of Santori (1987) who used daily
and weekly returns for S&P 500 over a 10 years period. In addition, Miller
and Galloway (1997), examined the Mid Cap 400 index for evidence of
volatility change following the introduction of futures contract on the index.
The authors found no evidence of any increased volatility, if any, and their
results point to a possible reduction in underlying volatility.
Earlier study on other US indices by Edwards (1988a, 1988b) using
daily and intraday data for the period 1973-1987 for both the S&P 500 and
the Value line composite Index (VLCI). He found no evidence linking futures
trading to an increase in underlying stock market volatility. Similarly, Choi
and Subramaniam (1994) found no significant changes in the intraday
volatility in the underlying stock markets around the introduction of the
MMI futures.
Lee and Ohk (1992) studied the daily returns data for two years before
and after the introduction of futures in Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, UK and
US. They found that volatility increases significantly with the exception of
the Australian and Hong Kong stock markets. This implied a decrease in
volatility in Hong Kong and no change in volatility in Australia. However,
volatility on US and UK were mixed. They also found evidence of increased
volatility in Japan’s Nikkei-225 Index for the two years following futures
introduction on SIMEX. This confirmed the results of Freris (1990) and
Hogson and Nicholls (1991).
RELATIVE VOLATILITY
The linkages and interactions of stock market returns and future market
returns have been an area of major interest to researchers since the inception
of future contracts in 1982. Koutmas and Tucker (1996) examine the
volatility for a 10 years period from 1984 to 1993. They found futures
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volatility to be higher by using Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Engle-
Granger statistics. Daily volatility in both markets is highly persistent and
predictable on the basis of past innovations and the correlation is remarkably
stable. A similar finding made by Chu and Bubnys (1990), who examined
the relative volatility using the natural logarithm of daily closing prices for
the S&P 500 and the NYSE for the six years period from 1982 to 1988, found
futures volatility to be higher.
Yadav and Pope (1990) also examined the volatility using the natural
logarithm of both interday and intraday prices to compare FTSE 100 index
and futures volatility. They found futures volatility to be higher.  Additionally,
a similar findings was made by Yau et. al. (1990) for its futures contracts
and the Hong Kong’s Hang Seng index.
Interesting results are found on studies of the Japanese index and its
futures contract. Brenner et. al. (1990) examined daily closing prices of the
Nikkei futures contract traded on SIMEX and Osaka and compared it to the
TOPIX index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. They found lower futures
volatility (0.492% and 0.497% respectively compared to 0.548% for the
underlying index).
Bacha and Villa (1993) used the same volatility measures as Yadav and
Pope (1990) to test the volatility of the Nikkei Futures traded on SIMEX,
Osaka and the CME with the Nikkei Stock Index. They found no difference
of volatility of the underlying Nikkei Stock Index from the SIMEX, but
marginally higher than the futures traded in Osaka. The argument made by
the authors is due to tighter regulatory framework on the OSE relative to
SIMEX. Similar findings also found by Choudry (1997), who studied short
run relative volatility on the Hang Seng, the Australian All Ordinaries and
the Nikkei. With the exception of Nikkei, the other future contracts were
found to be more volatile than the underlying markets.
FUTURES EXPIRATION DAY EFFECT
The logic assumes that futures prices become less volatile as expiration is
approached. However, Samuelson (1965) theorizes that futures become
more volatile as expiration is reached. Edwards (1988) did find that volatility
of stock returns was higher, on average, for futures expiration days than for
non-expiration days from 1983 to 1986, particularly in the last hour of
trading. The results are supported by Hancock (1991) who finds an expiration
day effect for the S&P 500.
Similarly, Stoll and Whaley (1987) have studied the volatility which
include the triple witching days and find that the S&P 500 index volatility
increases on expiration days especially during the last hour of trading.
Furthermore, prices tend to fall at the end of the day and to reverse at the
opening of trading on the next day. They draw a comparison with block
trades, where volume and volatility are temporary high and followed by
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small price reversals. They argued that the effects of expiration are small
and confined to brief periods of time, and reflect the costs of providing
liquidity to futures traders.
In addition, Karakullukcu (1992) finds no expiration day effect on the
FTSE 100. He argues that this could be due to the FTSE futures contracts’
settlement prices are calculated based on mid morning rather than closing
prices. Similar results are obtained by Bacha and Villa (1993), for the Nikkei
stock and futures contracts. However, they argue that these could be due to
the staggered expiration dates and the use of different final settlement prices.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the evidence of an expiration day
effect on the underlying stock market volatility is mixed.
EVIDENCE ON MISPRICING
Mispricing represents price deviates from its fair value adjusted for net
carrying costs. However, the existence of index arbitrage should keep these
deviations to a minimum. In contrast, this sorts of risk free opportunities do
frequently exist for short period of time. Arbitrageurs’ trade quickly correct
the mispricing though. Their actions ensure that cash and futures prices
remain highly correlated and converge towards contract expiry. Studies on
index futures traded in the US by Bhatt and Cakici (1990), Morse (1988),
Billingsley and Change (1988) find deviations from fair-values that were
significantly large, that transaction cost alone would not be sufficient to
explain the deviations.
Figlewski (1984) notes in the first year of trading stock index futures
prices were persistently too low. He concludes that underpricing were “a
transitory phenomenon caused by unfamiliarity with the new markets and
institutional inertia in developing systems to take advantage of the
opportunities presented”. In other words;
a. Investors were  unfamiliar with the marking to market of stock index
futures contract.
b. Investors were uncertain about legal aspects and accounting procedures
from futures trading.
c. Investors were unsure about how these contracts should be theoretically
priced.
d. The pricing improved as markets matured.
Interestingly, foreign stock index futures prices exhibited similar mispricing
in earlier years. Studies on S&P 500 that included transaction cost, such as
those by Kipnis and Tsang (1984) and Arditti et al. (1986) found considerable
mispricing. Though both over and mispricing were evident, there appeared
to be a greater tendency for underpricing. The underpricing was particularly
in evidence in the initial period of contract. Though the inclusion of
transaction costs creates no arbitrage bound resulting in less net mispricing,
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Klemkosky and Lee (1991) who also include indirect costs such as marking
to market and futures taxes found mispricing in about 5% of the time.
Brenner, Subrahmanyam and Uno (1989) find that Japanese stock index
futures sold at a discount during the first two years. The size of mispricing
declined over time. In the study, they find that approximately 42% of the
observations are found in excess of the estimated transaction costs. The
authors argue that the mispricing is due to the regulatory relaxation. This
confirmed the earlier results of Kipnis and Tsang  (1984) and Arditti et al.
(1986).  Furthermore, Bacha and Villa (1993) replicate the Brenner et. al.
(1989) study over a longer period to include the Nikkei futures traded in
OSAKA and SIMEX. By dividing their study into three sub-periods, they find
mispricing in the first period, little mispricing in the second period and near
consistent overpricing in sub-period three. The authors argued that this
mispricing changes had to do with regulatory change in Japan.
Yadav and Pope (1990) find that before Great Britain deregulated its
financial markets in 1986, the FTSE-100 trading on the London International
Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) was usually too low relative to its
theoretical price, mispricing, however, reduces as the contract approaches
maturity.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
DATA DESCRIPTION
Daily price data of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Composite Index
(KLSE CI) for the 7 years period from July 1993 to June 1999 is used. These
are daily high, low, open and close prices. The information is obtained from
HA Options & Financial Futures Sdn. Bhd., a trading member of KLOFFE.
Similarly, daily stock prices from 15 December 1994 to 14 December 1996
are also collected from the above mentioned trading member of KLOFFE.
This section of study excludes the data in 1997 due to the unstable market
conditions especially during the second quarter of 1997. Daily high, low,
open and close prices for KLCI futures spot month contract from the first day
of trading, 15 December 1995 to 30 June 1999 is used. Fifteen minutes high,
low, open and close price, volume and number of ticks for KLCI futures
spot month contract are also gathered. The data sets are also obtained from
the same source. The dividend yield for the three and the half year period
are obtained from various issues of Investors Digest. Three month KLIBOR
rates are obtained from the Bank Negara database accessible via the internet.
Beta and market capitalization is taken from Corporate Handbook: Malaysia
(1996). The beta is collected from 28th September 1994 to 28th September
1996 (average for 104 weeks). The market capitalization of each stock is
measured on the 28th September 1996.
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METHODOLOGY
i) Measure of Volatility
Volatility on Underlying. Several measures of volatility were estimated and
compared to determine the sensitivity of the conclusions to the measure of
volatility used. This study employed three measures of volatility, which are
as follows:
a) Close to Close method
The logarithmic return of daily closing prices is
In(C
t
 / C
t-1
)
where C
t
 = closing price on day t.
The standard deviation of this return is used as the measure of intraday
volatility. Standard deviation is useful because it summarizes the probability
of seeing extreme values of return. When standard deviation is large, the
chance of a large positive and negative return is large.
b) High Low Method
The natural logarithm of the day’s highest and lowest prices is
In (H
t
 / L
t
)
The mean and the standard deviation of the return series is the two key
variables used to test the changes in volatility.
Parkinson’s Estimator (1980) showed that under certain restrictive assump-
tions, it is more efficient than the traditional close-to-close variance. The
difficulty of estimating true volatility occurs because of the lack of continuous
price observations; the closing price is only one observation each day. In
addition, Beckers (1983), empirically compared the two estimates and found
that, in general, Parkinson’s estimator contained new information and was a
more accurate estimator of true volatility.
To assess the impact of futures introduction on underlying market
volatility, cash market daily volatility for both before and after the induction
on 15 December 1995 are computed and tested to see if there is a
statistically significant change in volatility. In addition to the entire period,
this study examines a ± 15 days, 30 days, 60 days, 1.5 years, 2.5 years and
3.5 years window surrounding KLCI futures introduction.
c) KLSE CI and Non KLSE CI Group Comparison
In addition to the above two methods, this research also use the cross-
sectional sample which includes a set of KLSE CI firms and a matched
control set to examine whether there will be a difference in volatility before
and after the futures trading.
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Many factors may cause the change in volatility of stock price beside
the introduction of futures trading. Among others are beta, price level, firm
size and trade frequency (Harris, 1989). Therefore, this research involves a
careful selection of the non-KLSE CI firm sample as it serve as a control for
the variation by making two stock sample as comparable as possible.
The beta is computed by using the formula, b = log (return of stock/
return of KLSE CI). Other relevant parameter such as market activity and
company’s business activities are also considered to improve the accuracy in
selection of a matching stock.  The matching list of component stocks in
KLSE CI with their corresponding stocks in Non-KLSE CI can be requested
from the authors. It is impossible to have two perfectly matched firms that
will suit to all the above mentioned criterias due to a limitation of available
listed firms in KLSE Main Board. Although two firms are categorized under
a same sector, their nature of business might not be the same because they
are engaging in different kinds of business. Furthermore, many firms are
holding companies, which have diverse interest and their actual core business
cannot be easily determined. According to Kok (1992), the new business
activities are also not clearly defined within the board classifications adopted
by the KLSE. Therefore, for convenient matching, priority will be based on
the same industry and similar firm beta. New listed firms are excluded from
the matching list because those stocks will not be able to provide sufficient
range of data for the testing period of pre and post futures trading. This
further reduced the available stocks for matching purposes. In addition,
those firms with some period of stable price might not be representative of
the price volatility behavior of the stocks in the Non-KLSE CI and might
give an error to the study.
From Table 1, the average firm beta and standard deviation for KLSE CI
and Non-KLSE CI samples are 1.0798 (0.3910) and 1.1095 (0.4163)
respectively. From this table, the beta for the two samples set are almost
similar, therefore, this study assumes that they have similar sensitivity to any
changes in the market.
TABLE 1. Descriptive Statistics of Tested Samples
Sample Firm Beta (β) Market Capitalization
(RM’million)
Mean σ Mean σ
100 stocks from 1.0798 0.3910 3524.8 6373.3
the components of
KLSE CI
100 stocks of 1.1095 0.4163 1083.7 1070.8
Non-component
of KLSE CI
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The variances of daily stock returns serve as a barometer for volatility.
Therefore, a comparison of variance is made by SPSS Program software. It
has been known for some time that F test is quite sensitive to the data’s
departure from normality, therefore, it is quite satisfactory to test the
normality of a sample (Levene 1960). When the underlying distribution are
non-normal, F test can have an actual size several times larger than their
level of significance (Brown & Forsythe, 1974). Early researches has
confirmed that unconditional distributions of security price changes are
leptokurtic, skewed and volatility clustered (Taufiq 1996). Here, Levene test
will be used to test the assumption in analysis of variance (ANOVA) that the
sample variances are equal. The null hypothesis (Ho) states that there is no
difference in the variance in pre-futures period (σ2
pre
) and post-futures period
(σ2
post
). Therefore,
     Ho: σ2 
pre 
= σ2 
post
Relative Volatility Between Futures Market and Underlying Stock
Inter-market volatility comparison is determined by comparing the volatility
measures on a contemporaneous basis. This study employed two measures,
which are Bacha and Villa (1993) and Parkinson Extreme Value Estimator
(1980). If the variance of the KLCI  Futures and KLSE CI is the same, we
can conclude that the volatility between two markets is equal. In addition,
F ratio (parametric) is used to test the statistical significance.
iii) Futures Expiration Day Effect
To test the existence of expiration day effect, this study employed Feinstein
and Goetzmann’s (1988) non parametric median test. By using this test,
firstly, all the non-expiration days are determined. There are 830 non-
expiration days in the period of study from December 1995 to June 1999.
Secondly, the 1st quartile, median and 3rd quartile ranges of stock volatility
are determined by the use of the two volatility measures mentioned above.
Here, half of the non-expiration days should fall inside and half should fall
outside the inter-quartile range. In order to see whether expiration days
deviate from this pattern, cumulative binomial distribution is used to test the
probability that expiration days volatility are different from that non-
expiration days. A low probability indicates that expiration days are
statistically different from non-expiration days, and thus is a significant
event. However, a high probability shows that the different between the two
is not significant.
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iv) Evidence On Futures Mispricing
A stock index futures contract can be priced by using the “replication
principle”. According to this, the “fair” price is related to the price of a
portfolio that replicates its futures payoffs.
Mispricing
In measuring the deviation of actual price from “fair” price, i.e. the extent
of mispricing on the KLCI futures, mispricing is computed. The mispricing
can be expressed as a percentage deviation, given by:
M
t
 = ( FA
t
 – F
t
 ) / F
t
(1)
Where M
t
 is the mispricing, express as the difference between the actual
futures price, FA
t
, and the fair futures price, F
t
, as a percentage of the fair
price.
Standard Cost of Carry Model
Two sets of mispricing analysis is carried out in this model; that is with and
without transaction cost. In the absence of transaction cost, the fair price is
computed using this model on an annualized basis.
F
t
 = S
t
 * (1 + r – d) t,T (2)
Where S
t
= price of the stock index on day t,
r = 3 month annualized KLIBOR rate on day t
d = annualized dividend yield
t,T = time remaining to maturity (T – t / 365)
In order to take transaction cost into account, let C+ be the cost of a cash and
carry strategy and C- as cost of a reverse cash and carry. We estimate a
higher cost for a reverse cash and carry transaction and so add an additional
0.10% to C+ to arrive at C-
. 
The details of transaction costs estimation is as
follows:
TABLE 2. Transaction Cost  Estimation
KLSE KLCI FUTURES
Commission 0.6% 0.06%
Bid/ask 0.4% 0.05%
Tax Nil Nil
Total 1.0% 0.11%
Source: HA Options and Financial Futures Sdn. Bhd.
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These transaction costs imply that it is profitable to execute a buy spot-
sell futures transaction only if the actual futures price exceeds the fair value
given in equation ( 2 ) by more than the percentage C
t
+. And only if the
futures price is below the spot price by more than the percentage C
t
- buying
futures-sell spot arbitrage become viable. Transaction costs create a band
with an upper bound of F
t
+ and a lower bound of F
t
- with no arbitrage
opportunities as follows:
F
t
+ = S
t 
(1 + C+)(1 + r – d)t,T (3)
F
t
- = S
t 
(1 - C-)(1 + r – d)t,T
Using these bounds, mispricing inclusive of transaction cost, M
t
 is as
follows, if
Ft Ft
+ M t =
Ft − Ft
+
Ft
+
Ft
− F1 Ft
+ Mt = 0
Ft Ft
− Mt =
Ft − Ft
−
Ft
−
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
This section provides the results and analysis of the research questions.
i) Impact of Futures Introduction on Underlying Market
a) Close to Close and High Low method
To assess the impact of futures contract introduction on underlying assets,
this study examines the volatility of the underlying stock market before and
after the start of future trading.
Table 3 shows the alternative measures of volatility estimate for individual
sub-period for daily data from 15 June, 1992 to 15 June, 1999. This table
extends the analysis by looking at the 15 days, 30 days, 60 days, 1.5 years,
2.5 years and 3.5 years pre and post futures trading. It reports the intraday
highs and lows as well as close-to-close daily prices. Three conclusions
emerge from this table:
1. both the volatility measures for post introduction show marginally
higher volatility except for the window of 1.5 years, where Bacha and
Villa (1993) measures experienced a significant decreased in volatility
of 0.88%.
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2. both the 30 and 60 days of pre and post futures introduction show
relatively lower volatility; and
3. both the 2.5 years to 3.5 years window periods have significantly higher
volatility post introduction.
TABLE 3. Volatility Before and After Futures Tradings: Stock Index
(July 1992 To June 1999)
Line Close to High Low
Close Method Method
Pre-Futures Date SD (%) Mean SD (%)
1 15 days 24/11/95 to 14/12/95 0.99 0.0113 0.60
2 30 days 3/11/95 to 14/12/95 1.06 0.0119 0.57
3 60 days 21/9/95 to 14/12/95 1.03 0.0111 0.53
4 1.5 years 1/6/94 to 14/12/95 1.18 0.0099 0.45
5 2.5 years 14/6/93 to 14/12/95 1.44 0.0136 0.99
6 3.5 years 15/6/92 to 14/12/95 2.14 0.0120 0.92
Post-Futures
7 15 days 16/12/95 to 9/1/96 1.20 0.0120 0.70
8 30 days 16/12/95 to 30/1/96 1.21 0.0129 0.78
9 60 days 16/12/95 to 20/3/96 1.15 0.0120 0.71
10 1.5 years 16/12/95 to 17/6/97 0.88 0.0100 0.60
11 2.5 years 16/12/95 to 15/6/98 2.08 0.0181 1.65
12 3.5 years 16/12/95 to 15/6/99 2.54 0.0219 2.16
The results are obvious from Figure 1 and 2. Figure 1 plots the standard
deviation of volatility measure In(C
t
/C
t-1
) for several window periods before
and after KLOFFE’s opening. It shows that standard deviation decrease
marginally from 2.14% (15 June 1992) to 1.15% (20 March 1996). By
extending the window period to 17 June 1997, standard deviation drop
significantly to 0.88%. This may be due to the commencement of currency
crisis. Again, it increase to 2.54% in 15 June 1999 as the capital control
measures took place in September 1998.
It is obvious that this statistical procedure is quite crude in that it does
not account for factors that might influence daily price volatility. It is
doubtful that the rise in stock volatility is due to anything associated with
the futures trading. Therefore, it seems that the more reliable results are
based on window periods 15 days, 30 days and 60 days. As a result, one can
concludes that KLOFFE’s opening had no meaningful impact on stock
market volatility.
Figure 2 plots the standard deviation of volatility measure In(H
t
/L
t
) for
the same window period as Figure 1. Again, it shows no increase in
volatility.
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FIGURE 1. KLSE Volatility In (C
t
/C
t-1
), Pre and Post Futures Trading
FIGURE 2. KLSE Volatility In (H
t
/L
t
), Pre and Post Futures Trading
Overall, the introduction of stock futures trading in KLOFFE had no
measurable effect on the stock price volatility. This is consistent with the
most recent research done by Pericli and Koutman (1997), which examined
S&P 500 returns over period of 1953 to September 1994.
b) KLSE CI And Non KLSE CI Group Comparison
Volatility of Pre and Post Futures Period For All Tested Stocks
In this section, we will examine the volatility of every component stock in
both the KLSE CI (subject sample) and non KLSE CI (control sample) for the
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pre and the post-futures period. A comparison of volatility in pre and post-
futures period for all component stock in KLSE CI with their matching stocks
of non-KLSE CI is made.
From the above, we then make a comparison regarding to the magnitude
of changes in volatility for those stocks by computing the percentage
changes in variance (PCV
i
) before and after the futures trading.
The mean percentage change in variance (MPCV
j
) for every sector and
the group sample is as stipulated in Table 4.
TABLE 4. Mean Percentage Change In Variance For All Stocks
(Pre15/12/94 to 14/12/95 and Post 15/12/95 to 14/12/96)
Sector No. of stocks MPCV
j
MPCV
j
KLSE CI Non KLSE CI
Consumer product 14 0.396 0.242
Construction 7 -0.270 0.119
Hotel 2 1.807 0.415
Finance 14 -0.289 3.011
Industrial product 23 -0.213 0.136
Trading services 18 -0.066 0.135
Property 15 -0.252 -0.147
Mining 2 -0.314 1.051
Plantation 5 -0.224 1.498
Group 100 -0.084 0.718
From the above table, we can notice that majority of the KLSE CI sample
show a decrease in volatility after the KLOFFE’s opening (i.e. Construction,
Finance, Industrial product, Mining, Plantation, Property and Trading and
Services) except two sectors (i.e. Consumer product and Hotel). However,
this result is not shown in the non KLSE CI sample. In the non KLSE CI
group, only Property sector reports a decrease in volatility whereas others
show an increase in volatility. The reasons for the increase in volatility after
the futures trading for the two sectors in the subject group may be as
follows:
i. Nestle (M) Berhad, one of the stock in Consumer Product sector, has
700% increase in volatility in the post-futures period;
ii. The Hotel sector consists of only two stocks and both of them have a
p-value of significance more than 0.10, which indicates that the difference
in volatility before and after the futures trading is not significant.
As a whole, the subject group reports a decrease in volatility by 8.4% and
the control group however shows a increase in volatility by 71.8% after the
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KLOFFE’s opening. Therefore, the actual decrease in volatility for the
subject group due to the futures trading is the difference between the
volatility of the subject and the control group is 80.2%.
Volatility of Pre and Post Futures Period
To test whether the changes in volatility of pre and post-futures period is
significant or not, this study use Levene test.
TABLE 5. Mean Percentage Change In Variance For All Significant stocks
(Pre 15/12/94 to 14/12/95 and Post 15/12/95 to 14/12/96)
Sector Significant α = 0.05 Significant α = 0.10
No. Subject Control No. Subject Control
stocks stocks
Consumer product 7 0.837 0.561 8 0.698 0.415
Construction 3 -0.567 0.076 3 -0.567 0.076
Finance 8 -0.486 0.190 8 -0.486 0.190
Industrial product 12 -0.426 0.239 13 -0.369 0.188
Trading services 6 -0.275 -0.280 6 -0.275 -0.280
Property 9 -0.354 -0.092 11 -0.338 -0.136
Mining 1 -0.313 1.057 1 -0.313 1.057
Plantation 2 -0.540 1.300 2 -0.540 1.300
Group 48 -0.231 0.202 52 -0.222 0.153
Table 5 shows the mean percentage change in variance (PCV) for all the
significant stocks by sector in KLSE CI sample and compared to their
corresponding matched stocks. Hotel industry is excluded from the above
table due to the difference in variance is not significant.
 
In subject sample,
seven sectors show a decrease in volatility and one sector shows an increase
in volatility at both a = 0.05 and 0.10. However, only two sectors in control
group show a decrease in volatility whereas the rest shows an increase in
volatility after the futures trading.
Alternatively, if the Consumer product sector is disregarded due to an
exceptional stock, which is abnormally volatile, we could notice that all the
sectors in subject group show a decrease in volatility after the KLSE CI
Futures trading at both a = 0.05 and 0.10.  Moreover, majority of the sectors
in non KLSE CI sample report an increase in volatility.
Overall, after the KLOFFE’s opening, at a = 0.05, the significant stocks
in the subject group have a decrease in volatility of 23.10% compared to the
matched control group of an increase of 20.20%. On the other hand, if at a
= 0.10, the sample subject group has a decrease in volatility of 22.20%
compared to its control group which has an increase of 15.30%. The amount
of decrease in volatility for KLSE CI sample is slightly less at a = 0.10
compared to at a = 0.05.
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Volatility of Pre and Post Futures Period For The KLSE Composite Index
Table 6 shows the pre and post futures trading volatility for KLSE CI and
non-KLSE CI.
TABLE 6. PCV
i
 of KLSE CI and Non-KLSE CI
Index KLSE CI Non-KLSE CI
σ2
pre
0.000137 0.000172
σ2
post
0.000066 0.000142
PCV
I
-0.520710 -0.174815
From the above table, we notice that KLSE CI has σ2
pre
 = 0.000137 and
σ2
post
 = 0.000066, which shows a decrease of 52.10% in volatility after the
introduction of futures trading. However, its corresponding matched index
has σ2
pre
 = 0.000172 and σ2
post
 = 0.000142, which shows a decrease in
volatility of 17.50% after the futures introduction.
Here, assuming other things being equal, the magnitude of decrease in
volatility due to futures trading for the components of KLSE CI is larger than
its corresponding matched stocks. This might be due to KLSE CI is the
underlying asset of KLSE CI Futures and therefore, the trading of index
futures gives a direct impact on its underlying index and its components.
Volatility of 1st Post-Futures and 2nd Post-Futures Period
Immediately after the KLOFFE’s opening, the trading volume and frequency
might be low, therefore, the effect of futures trading on its underlying stocks
might not be obvious. This is to say that the volatility of the pre and post-
futures trading may not show much difference. Therefore, a comparison of
1st post-futures period (within six months immediately after the introduction
of KLSE CI Futures) and the 2nd post-futures period (after six months from
the introduction of KLSE CI Futures) is made.
Number of Stocks That Decrease In Volatility
Table 7 shows the number of stocks that decrease in volatility at a = 0.05
for the 1st post-futures period and the 2nd post-futures period for all the
component stocks in the KLSE CI. The results show that 24 and 53 stocks
significantly decrease in volatility in the 1st and 2nd post-futures period
respectively as compared to the pre-futures period. In other words, the
number of stocks which shows a decrease in volatility is double after the six
months period of the KLOFFE’s opening. This might be due to the inactive
trading in the futures market immediately after the futures trading. The
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investors are not familiar with the new futures market. On the other hand,
after sometimes, when the investors gain more information and more
confidence in the futures market, they participate more. Thus leads to more
stocks fall in volatility in 2nd post-futures period.
Magnitude of Decrease In Volatility
From Table 8, the results show that there are seven sectors indicate a
decrease in volatility and only two sectors show an increase in volatility in
the 1st post-futures period.  However, in the 2nd post-futures period, there are
TABLE 7. Number of Stocks Significantly Decrease In Volatility at α = 0.05
Sector No. of stocks Decrease In Volatility at a = 0.05
1st post-futures period 2nd post-futures period
Consumer product 4 6
Construction 3 3
Hotel 0 2
Finance 7 7
Industrial product 3 12
Trading services 3 6
Property 4 13
Mining 0 1
Plantation 0 3
Total 24 53
TABLE 8. Mean Percentage Change In Variance In Subject
Sample By Sectors
Sector No. of Stocks 1st Post-futures 2nd Post-futures
Period Period
Consumer product 14 -0.124 0.861
Construction 7 -0.157 -0.389
Hotel 2 4.199 -0.329
Finance 14 -0.188 -0.334
Industrial product 23 -0.075 -0.342
Trading services 18 0.269 -0.267
Property 15 -0.028 -0.509
Mining 2 -0.067 -0.512
Plantation 5 -0.118 -0.368
Group 100 0.045 -0.200
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eight sectors show a decrease in volatility and only one sector shows an
increase in volatility. If we look at the result as a whole, it shows a 4.50%
increase in volatility in the 1st post-futures period compared to a 20.0%
decrease in volatility in the 2nd post-futures period. Therefore, this indicate
that futures trading tend to decrease the volatility of its underlying stocks in
the later period compared to the period immediately after the KLOFFE’s
opening.
Discussion of The Research Results
The result of this study shows that there is a significant decrease in volatility
of the KLSE CI underlying stocks compared to their corresponding matched
stocks after the futures trading. All others being equal, the decline in
volatility might be due to the KLOFFE’s opening, which both increase the
information available to traders and enhances the information flow. Spot
market speculators with access to information reflected in futures prices will
take an action in the futures market when they expect the movement of the
futures prices. Therefore, the futures trading reduce its underlying spot price
fluctuation.
Furthermore, trading in the futures market reduced the cost of transaction.
The relative low cost of transaction in the futures market makes it worthwhile
for more traders to trade and communicate information. Arbitrage in stock
index futures also involves minimal storage cost condition where speculators
could easily bear price risks and act on information transmitted through spot
price. This enhances the stabilizing effect on the stock index spot market
(Lam 1988). Therefore, there is a reduction of the volatility of the index’s
underlying stocks after the futures trading.
Investor who has a portfolio of stocks can hedge market risk by selling
KLSE CI Futures contract. If the market falls, the investors will suffer a loss
because the value of his portfolio will also fall. However, the KLSE CI
Futures will fall as well, which allows the investor to make profit from the
falling futures prices to offset the loss on his portfolio. Similarly, when the
market rises, the losses on the futures contract at least can be partly offset
by the profits on the original stock portfolio. Thus, by selling KLSE CI
Futures, investors can reduce the volatility of their portfolios caused by
market-wide events.
If the investor holds a stock portfolio, which consists of KLSE CI
underlying stocks, the hedging process will be more effective. This is
because the fluctuation of KLSE CI futures prices is closely correlated with
its underlying stocks. Therefore, the risk of a portfolio of KLSE CI underlying
stocks is certainly less compared to a portfolio of Non-KLSE CI underlying
stocks if both are hedged with KLSE CI futures. Consequently, the volatility
of the portfolio of KLSE CI underlying stocks will be far lower compared to
the portfolio of Non-KLSE CI underlying stocks. This may be one of the
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reasons why KLSE CI underlying stocks show a large decrease in volatility
compared to their corresponding matched stocks after the futures trading.
ii) Relative Volatility Between Futures And Stock Markets
Table 9 and 10 show the price volatility comparison between futures and
stocks under different measurement.
a) Close to Close Method ((Bacha and Villa (1993))
Table 9 reports the volatility by month based on daily close-to-close
volatility measure. Each contract expires at the end of the month. The table
also tells us that futures volatility is higher for 33 out of the 43 months
period, but only 5 is significant. Futures volatility is lower for 10 contract
months only, and none of which is significant.
Figure 3 plots the standard deviation of monthly returns to the KLSE CI
and the futures contract from 1995 to 1999. Daily returns are used to
calculate the standard deviation for each month. There are 12 points per year
in the plot.
Figure 3 shows that the level of stock volatility has not increased during
the period of the study, but it highlights the dramatic increase in volatility
in September, 1997 to February, 1998 and also September, 1998. It also
shows that the standard deviation of futures returns is usually higher than
that of stock returns, most noticeably in September 1998. There are two
concerns in  interpretating this result. One is that “noise traders” are more
FIGURE 3. Volatility for KLSE and KLOFFE, In(C
t
/L
t-1
)
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TABLE 9. Daily Price Volatility for KLCI Futures and KLSE CI
 KLCI Futures KLSE CI
In(Ct/Ct-1) Observation No. SD (%) SD (%)
  1 Dec-95 10 0.95 0.92
  2 Jan-96 23 1.21 1.29
  3 Feb-96 15 0.77 0.81
  4 Mac-96 21 1.44 1.26
  5 Apr-96 21 0.91 0.72
  6 May-96 20 0.39 0.6
  7 Jun-96 20 0.49 0.53
  8 Jul-96 22 0.87 0.83
  9 Aug-96 22 0.79 0.68
10 Sep-96 21 0.63 0.6
11 Oct-96 23 0.55 0.49
12 Nov-96 20 0.73* 0.39
13 Dec-96 21 1.08 0.95
14 Jan-97 22 0.57 0.66
15 Feb-97 16 0.59 0.61
16 Mac-97 21 0.48 0.64
17 Apr-97 21 1.36 1.47
18 May-97 19 1.53* 1.15
19 Jun-97 21 1.17 0.82
20 Jul-97 22 1.33 1.1
21 Aug-97 21 3.1 2.14
22 Sep-97 21 4.94 3.83
23 Oct-97 22 3.28 2.33
24 Nov-97 20 4.89 4.21
25 Dec-97 22 4.29 4.16
26 Jan-98 17 4.85 3.97
27 Feb-98 19 5.37* 5.35
28 Mac-98 22 2.39 1.57
29 Apr-98 20 2.12 1.49
30 May-98 19 3.09 2.24
31 Jun-98 22 3.05 2.32
32 Jul-98 22 3.03 2.42
33 Aug-98 20 4.1 3.56
34 Sep-98 21 13.08* 9.7
35 Oct-98 21 2.11 2.15
36 Nov-98 21 2.32 1.73
37 Dec-98 22 1.88 1.47
38 Jan-99 16 1.4 1.7
39 Feb-99 17 3.4 2.4
40 Mac-99 22 1.87* 1.17
41 Apr-99 22 2.74 1.78
42 May-99 21 2.98 2.02
43 Jun-99 22 1.71 1.27
Total Period 873 3.18 2.34
*indicates KLOFFE is significantly more volatile than KLCI at KLSE at 5% level, using F-test
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TABLE 10. Daily Price Volatility for KLCI Futures and KLSE CI
KLCI Futures KLSE CI
IN(Ht/Lt) Observation No. Mean Mean
  1 Dec-95 10 0.0083 0.01
  2 Jan-96 23 0.0117 0.014
  3 Feb-96 15 0.0092 0.009
  4 Mac-96 21 0.0127 0.0122
  5 Apr-96 21 0.0084 0.0081
  6 May-96 20 0.0072 0.0087
  7 Jun-96 20 0.0055 0.0065
  8 Jul-96 22 0.0086 0.0093
  9 Aug-96 22 0.0088 0.0072
10 Sep-96 21 0.0094 0.0064
11 Oct-96 23 0.0065 0.0068
12 Nov-96 20 0.0071 0.0068
13 Dec-96 21 0.0115 0.0108
14 Jan-97 22 0.0075 0.0092
15 Feb-97 16 0.0081 0.01
16 Mac-97 21 0.0069 0.0096
17 Apr-97 21 0.0191 0.0204
18 May-97 19 0.02 0.0159
19 Jun-97 21 0.0178 0.0122
20 Jul-97 22 0.0184 0.015
21 Aug-97 21 0.0401 0.0291
22 Sep-97 21 0.0522 0.0401
23 Oct-97 22 0.0363 0.0242
24 Nov-97 20 0.0563 0.0433
25 Dec-97 22 0.0582 0.0422
26 Jan-98 17 0.0593 0.0443
27 Feb-98 19 0.0535 0.0401
28 Mac-98 22 0.0272 0.0183
29 Apr-98 20 0.0283* 0.0213
30 May-98 19 0.0389 0.0261
31 Jun-98 22 0.0381 0.0278
32 Jul-98 22 0.0401 0.0291
33 Aug-98 20 0.0551 0.0448
34 Sep-98 21 0.1377* 0.0822
35 Oct-98 21 0.0283 0.0238
36 Nov-98 21 0.0322 0.026
37 Dec-98 22 0.0235 0.0296
38 Jan-99 16 0.0190* 0.0189
39 Feb-99 17 0.0366 0.0276
40 Mac-99 22 0.0267 0.0201
41 Apr-99 22 0.0355 0.0261
42 May-99 21 0.0321 0.0275
43 Jun-99 22 0.0219 0.0174
Total Period 873 0.0279 0.0218
*indicates KLOFFE is significantly more volatile than KLCI at KLSE at 5% level, using F-test
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FIGURE 4. Daily Mispricing at KLCI Futures (With Transaction Cost)
active in the futures market, so temporary price swings are exaggerated (the
term “noise traders” refers to people who do not have correct information
about value of securities they trade) as reported by Black (1986). The
alternative is that futures contract prices react more quickly to new information
because the contract have lower transaction costs and they price the bundle
of underlying stock simultaneously. Amihud and Mendelson  (1989) conclude
that both these explanations contribute to the higher volatility of futures
returns.
b) High Low  Method (Parkinson Extreme Value Estimator (1980))
Table 10 and Figure 4 report the same day volatility measure as Table 9 and
Figure 3 but using the In(H
t
/L
t
) measure. By using this measure, future
volatility is higher for 32 out of 43 contract periods. This exhibit similar
results as the first measure. However, only 3 is significant. Futures volatility
is lower for 11 contracts only and none of which is significantly lower.  The
plot in Figure 4 shows similar pattern as Figure 3.
Overall, futures volatility is significantly higher by both measures. The
plots show higher levels of volatility following the currency crisis period.
The conclusions are the same for both measures of volatility. Finally, the
evidence indicates that futures returns are more volatile than stock index
returns when there are big price movements. The result is consistent with
earlier studies in other countries.
42 Jurnal Pengurusan 21
iii) Futures Expiration Day Effect
Table 11 shows the KLOFFE expiration day volatility on cash market using
In(Ct/Ct-1) and In(Ht/Lt). Each contract expires at the end of the month.
In(C
t
/C
t-1
) reports standard deviation of interday measure while In(H
t
/H
t-1
)
reports means of intraday measure. As from Table 12, the 1st quartile,
median and 3rd quartile ranges of stock volatility for non-expiration days by
using  lose-to-close volatility measure is –0.009, -0.001 and 0.08 respectively.
However, it reports the figure of 0.09, 0.016 and 0.029 respectively by using
the second volatility measure. The inter-quartile range is then plot in Figure
5 and 6 respectively. The graphical presentation for Table 11 for KLOFFE
expiration day volatility on cash market is shown in Figure 5 and 6. Table
12  shows the summary results for the period under study. It shows that 20
and 26 respectively out of the 43 sample of expiration days by using the
respective measures fall within the inter-quartile range, while 23 and 17
samples fall outside the inter-quartile range.
To assess whether the expiration day volatility is statistically different
from that of the sample of non-expiration day, cumulative binomial
distribution is used to test the likelihood that the observed expiration day
volatility would occur in a sample of non-expiration day. A low probability
indicates a significant different event and thus denotes expiration days as
unusual. As we can see from Table 12, the cumulative binomial probability
for the two respective measures are 16.3% and 71.6%.  It is obvious that the
probabilities are much higher than the 5% or 10% level of significant test.
The main conclusion of this study is that futures expiration day has no
impact on underlying stock volatility because the stock market volatility has
no different in future expiration day relative to non-expiration day. This
could be due to the KLCI futures contracts settlement prices are calculated
FIGURE 5. KLOFFE Expiration Day Volatility on Cash Market, In(C
t
/C
t-1
)
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TABLE 11. KLCI Futures Expiration Day Volatility on Cash Market
Contract Month In(Ct/Ct-1) In(Ht/Lt)
  1 Dec-95 0.001 0.006
  2 Jan-96 0.002 0.011
  3 Feb-96 0.007 0.007
  4 Mar-96 0.02 0.007
  5 Apr-96 0.014 0.014
  6 May-96 0.003 0.007
  7 Jun-96 0.001 0.011
  8 Jul-96 0.014 0.015
  9 Aug-96 0.007 0.012
10 Sep-96 0.004 0.005
11 Oct-96 0.007 0.006
12 Nov-96 -0.004 0.01
13 Dec-96 0.019 0.019
14 Jan-97 0.001 0.007
15 Feb-97 0.009 0.009
16 Mac-97 -0.012 0.019
17 Apr-97 0.019 0.019
18 May-97 -0.001 0.009
19 Jun-97 0.007 0.008
20 Jul-97 -0.012 0.015
21 Aug-97 -0.01 0.044
22 Sep-97 0.007 0.017
23 Oct-97 0.003 0.032
24 Nov-97 -0.009 0.051
25 Dec-97 0.009 0.026
26 Jan-98 0.019 0.019
27 Feb-98 0.024 0.017
28 Mac-98 -0.005 0.012
29 Apr-98 0.005 0.014
30 May-98 -0.012 0.022
31 Jun-98 0.011 0.021
32 Jul-98 0.033 0.033
33 Aug-98 -0.034 0.024
34 Sep-98 -0.025 0.02
35 Oct-98 -0.003 0.009
36 Nov-98 -0.007 0.03
37 Dec-98 -0.02 0.05
38 Jan-99 -0.007 0.019
39 Feb-99 -0.013 0.016
40 Mac-99 0.008 0.025
41 Apr-99 0.009 0.015
42 May-99 -0.015 0.015
43 Jun-99 -0.023 0.026
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TABLE 12. Summary Results of Expiration Day Effect
In(Ct/Ct-1) In(Ht/Lt)
Interquartile Range
1st Quartile -0.009 0.009
Median -0.001 0.016
3rd Quartile 0.008 0.029
Expiration days
Inside IQR 20 26
Outside IQR 23 17
43 43
Non Expiration days 830 830
Total 873 873
Probability 16.3% 71.6%
FIGURE 6. KLOFFE Expiration Day Volatility on Cash Market, In(H
t
/L
t
)
based on the average value of the stock index for the last half hour of the
trading, that is from 4.45pm to 5.15pm. This determination of settlement
price is quite different from the Nikkei or FTSE 100. Lastly, the result
reported is consistent with the studies conducted in other countries such as
by Stoll and Whaley (1987), Karakullukcu (1992), and Bacha and Villa
(1993).
Volatility, Expiration Day Effect and Pricing Efficiency 45
(iv) Futures Mispricing
a) Without Transaction Cost
Table 13 shows the summary results of average daily mispricing for each
contract month for the period under study with no transaction cost. The table
also reports overall mispricing, being the average of under and overpricing.
It also shows that 25 of the 43 contracts studied had mean underpricing of
which 16 were significant. On the other hand, only 17 contracts had mean
overpricing and 9 were significant. The standard deviation of mispricing
shows a steady increase over the later contracts. The mispricing  is graphed
and presented in Figure 7.
From the above observation, three conclusions can be drawn. First,
there appears to be much more frequent underpricing than overpricing for
the period before crisis. Second, the percentage and magnitude of underpricing
is larger. Overpricing appears to be of a lower magnitude. Third, there
appears to be stretches of very little or no overpricing (i.e. March to
September 1996). The result also shows mispricing is larger in the later
period of the study. This contradict with the findings of Brenner et al. (1989)
and Bacha and Fremault (1993) which shows reduced mispricing over time.
If one ignored the currency crisis starting from July 1997, there is clearly no
declining trend in mispricing over the one and the half year period before
crisis. Table 14 shows the breakdown of mean underpricing and overpricing
with the number of days on which underpricing and overpricing. The earlier
observation of higher frequency of underpricing before currency crisis is
explained and summarised in Table 15.
FIGURE 7. Daily Mispricing at KLCI Futures (Without Transaction Cost)
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TABLE 13. Daily Mispricing Summary Statistics
Contract Observation No. Mean (%) Significant SD (%)
  1 Dec-95 10 0.11 0.26
  2 Jan-96 23 0.09 0.34
  3 Feb-96 15 0.53 * 0.52
  4 Mac-96 21 -0.08 0.29
  5 Apr-96 21 -0.39 * 0.3
  6 May-96 20 -0.3 * 0.42
  7 Jun-96 20 -0.73 * 0.37
  8 Jul-96 22 -0.5 * 0.33
  9 Aug-96 22 -0.92 * 0.53
10 Sep-96 21 -0.43 * 0.56
11 Oct-96 23 0.11 0.32
12 Nov-96 20 0.22 * 0.39
13 Dec-96 21 -0.07 0.5
14 Jan-97 22 -0.21 0.7
15 Feb-97 16 0.19 0.55
16 Mar-97 21 -0.31 0.72
17 Apr-97 21 -0.99 * 1.57
18 May-97 19 -0.56 2.54
19 Jun-97 21 -0.67 1.51
20 Jul-97 22 -1.44 * 2.15
21 Aug-97 21 -3.51 * 4.32
22 Sep-97 21 -3.08 * 6.67
23 Oct-97 22 -2.74 * 5.2
24 Nov-97 20 -3.54 * 5.07
25 Dec-97 22 0.32 6.92
26 Jan-98 17 1.68 9.7
27 Feb-98 19 -0.25 4.27
28 Mar-98 22 -0.97 3.48
29 Apr-98 20 -4.45 * 2.65
30 May-98 19 -3.85 * 4.3
31 Jun-98 22 -1.3 4.51
32 Jul-98 22 -2.07 * 3.71
33 Aug-98 20 -3.56 * 5.83
34 Sep-98 21 6.53 17.56
35 Oct-98 21 3.95 * 4.17
36 Nov-98 21 4.17 * 2.86
37 Dec-98 22 3.23 * 1.89
38 Jan-99 16 2.67 * 3.63
39 Feb-99 17 -0.3 3.94
40 Mar-99 22 0.54 3.59
41 Apr-99 22 4.62 * 2.87
42 May-99 21 1.57 * 2.19
43 Jun-99 22 1.53 * 1.21
*indicates that mispricing is significantly different from 0 using t-test at 10% level
Volatility, Expiration Day Effect and Pricing Efficiency 47
TABLE 14. Daily Mispricing Without Transaction Cost
Underpricing (Mt<0) Overpricing (Mt>0)
Contract Observation No. days Mean (%) No.days Mean (%)
No.
Dec-95 10 5 -0.1 * 5 0.33 *
Jan-96 23 8 -0.27 * 15 0.25 *
Feb-96 15 3 -0.13 12 0.77 *
Mar-96 21 15 -0.25 * 6 0.28 *
Apr-96 21 19 -0.4 * 2 0.07
May-96 20 14 -0.53 * 6 0.21 *
Jun-96 20 19 -0.77 * 1 0.3 *
Jul-96 22 20 -0.55 * 2 0.08 *
Aug-96 22 21 -0.96 * 1 0.04
Sep-96 21 15 -0.69 * 6 0.21 *
Oct-96 23 9 -0.22 * 14 0.33 *
Nov-96 20 5 -0.17 * 15 0.35 *
Dec-96 21 12 -0.39 * 9 0.36 *
Jan-97 22 15 -0.63 * 7 0.58 *
Feb-97 16 6 -0.36 * 10 0.52 *
Mac-97 21 14 -0.7 * 7 0.48 *
Apr-97 21 15 -1.86 * 6 1.2 *
May-97 19 10 -2.57 * 9 1.45 *
Jun-97 21 16 -1.26 * 5 1.21 *
Jul-97 22 16 -2.49 * 6 1.35 *
Aug-97 21 17 -4.99 * 4 2.81 *
Sep-97 21 14 -6.73 * 7 4.21 *
Oct-97 22 16 -4.1 * 6 4.22 *
Nov-97 20 15 -5.76 * 5 3.12 *
Dec-97 22 10 -5.86 * 12 5.48 *
Jan-98 17 9 -5.48 * 8 9.74 *
Feb-98 19 11 -3.02 * 8 3.56 *
Mac-98 22 13 -2.97 * 9 1.93 *
Apr-98 20 19 -4.69 * 1 0.19
May-98 19 16 -5.22 * 3 3.47
Jun-98 22 15 -3.71 * 7 3.85 *
Jul-98 22 16 -3.91 * 6 2.83 *
Aug-98 20 16 -6.05 * 4 6.39 *
Sep-98 21 7 -4.38 * 14 11.99 *
Oct-98 21 6 -1.32 * 15 6.06 *
Nov-98 21 2 -0.39 * 19 4.66 *
Dec-98 22 1 -0.5 * 21 3.41 *
Jan-99 16 4 -1.54 * 12 4.42 *
Feb-99 17 9 -3.33 * 8 2.72 *
Mar-99 22 13 -1.56 * 9 3.57 *
Apr-99 22 1 -0.77 * 21 4.88 *
May-99 21 5 -1.04 * 16 2.44 *
Jun-99 22 1 -0.54 * 21 1.63 *
873 493 380
*indicates mispricing is significant at 10% level.
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We can see obviously that 64% (256 out of 400 days) of the observed
mispricing was negative. This is in contrast to the early research by Yau et
al. (1990) on S&P 500 futures contract whose prices were constantly at a
premium. The average size of the negative mispricing, -0.86% of the spot
index is greater than that of the positive mispricing, 0.56%. Similarly the
standard deviation of the negative mispricing is higher than that of the
positive (0.94% versus 0.60%). Extreme overpricing did happen, though not
frequently. It is observed that most of the positive mispricing are clustered
around five months: January and February 1996, October and November
1996, and February 1997.
b) With Transaction Costs
Table 16 shows the mean over and underpricing with transaction costs with
the number of days of overpricing and underpricing as defined by M
t
.  The
mean is calculated for the days on which underpricing and overpricing was
large enough to violate the transaction cost upper and lower bounds.  Figure
TABLE 15.  Futures Mispricing from 15/12/95 to 31/7/97
Underpricing Overpricing
Overall mean -0.86 0.56
Overall standard deviation 0.94 0.60
Observation no. (400) 256 144
FIGURE 8. Daily Mispricing at KLCI Futures (With Transaction Cost)
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TABLE 16. Daily Mispricing With Transaction Cost
Contract Observation Underpricing (M
t
<0) Overpricing (M
t
>0)
No. No. days Mean(%) No. days Mean(%)
0
0
2
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
5
3
2
4
6
5
4
10
6
7
6
0
3
5
5
4
11
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5
6
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210
indicates mispricing is significant at 10% level
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
0.00
0.00
0.18
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.60
1.12
0.59
1.00
2.30
3.64
4.30
2.05
5.21
11.51
2.88
1.65
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2.34
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3.74
2.28
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4.05
3.94
1.78
1.32
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8 shows the graph of daily mispricing with transaction of KLCI Futures. One
obvious observation is that positive mispricing have disappeared up to
March 1997 except for one contract month of February 1996.  This is due
to the fact that before the transaction costs, the magnitude of positive
mispricing was not large. The average size of the positive mispricing is
about 0.44% of the spot index. With a transaction costs of 1.11%, all of the
positive mispricing were considered within bounds up to March 1997 (i.e.
the futures contract were priced fairly according to the cost of carry model).
However, 246 cases of negative mispricing remained after the transaction
costs. In addition, majority of the mispricing for April 1997 to September
1998 contracts still experienced negative mispricing even after the transaction
costs. However, September 1998 to June 1999 contracts was overvalued
most of the time.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this section, summary, concluding remarks, limitation of the research,
implications and suggestions for additional research are discussed.
i) Impact of Futures Trading On Its Underlying Stocks
The main conclusion of this study is that the introduction of financial futures
trading has not destabilized cash markets. Both the day to day and intra-day
price volatility of the stock and futures markets over the seven year period
from 1992 to 1999 were examined. No evidence was found which links
future trading to an increase in general market volatility. If anything, the one
and the half years period following the futures introduction had lowered the
volatility. However, this may be due to the currency crisis.
In this study, we also provide an empirical investigation of the volatility
of 100 component stocks in KLSE CI and non KLSE CI before and after the
KLSE CI futures introduction and we find evidence of decrease in volatility.
Seven industry sectors in KLSE CI have declined in volatility (8.40%)
whereas its corresponding matched group shows an increase of 71.80% in
the post compared to the pre-futures period. At the significant level of a =
0.05 and 0.10, the decrease in volatility of KLSE CI group are 23.10% and
22.20% respectively compared to its corresponding matched group, which
shows an increase by 20.20% and 15.30% respectively.
Fifty-three stocks have decreased in volatility in the 2nd post-futures
period compared to only 24 stocks in the 1st post-futures period. In the 1st
post-futures period, KLSE CI sample shows slight increase in volatility, but
in the 2nd post-futures period, it shows a decrease of 20%. This might be due
to relatively more active trading in the futures market sometimes after from
the introduction date. An increase in involvement of market participants
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tends to stabilize the underlying spot market and subsequently reduces the
volatility.
KLSE CI Futures trading might decrease its underlying stock price
volatility by three reasons. It increases information flow, increases market
liquidity and provides hedging opportunities. The existence of futures
trading in a market should increase the speed with which information is
disseminated, the area over which it is disseminated and the degree of
saturation within the area. It should tend to equalize the flows of information
to current and potential futures and cash market participants. Therefore, the
decrease in volatility of KLSE CI underlying stocks could be due to the
improvement in the information flows fostered by the KLSE CI Futures
trading.
In this study, we are dealing with the stock price volatility where the
fluctuations of the stock prices might be due to both internal (firm-specific
characteristics) and external factors (economic, technological, political and
legal), which are not predictable, therefore, this study might involve various
practical difficulties that cannot be completely resolved. To isolate the
unrequired volatility, this study has constructed a sample of matching stocks
as group and chose a short test period to minimize the time variation of
stock price. The matching of the stocks might not be perfect due to the small
number of stocks available for matching.
The volatility of financial markets has become increasingly important
for market participants, regulators and academicians. Innovations in the
financial products offered to the market have increased the complexity of the
financial environment. Some of these recent innovations such as financial
derivative securities have received considerable media attention. Market
participants are keen to know whether this kind of innovations will have any
impact to the markets especially for their underlying stocks to enable them
to make an economic profit in this complex market.
From this study, it shows that the trading in futures market will
eventually reduce the volatility of its underlying stocks. An increase in a
well-informed speculative trading may decrease the volatility  and increase
liquidity because informed traders provide liquidity in such events (Harris,
1989).
The results are important for the regulators and markets, especially the
KLSE and KLOFFE, because the evidence is inconsistent with the public
perception that derivatives increase risk. At the same time, these results are
important to the academicians who seek to understand more on how
derivative securities may be related to financial risk. Besides, the research
results provide a general reference for those market participants who would
benefit from understanding the relationship of price volatility behavior
between the futures trading and its underlying stocks. This is particularly
important for those investors and speculators who are continuously seeking
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for better ways of estimating the volatility of underlying stocks. For
portfolio managers, they might be able to perform better planning and
implementation of their investment decision and better selection of investment
portfolio with the guideline of this research.
To further test the hypothesis developed in this research, more studies
need to be conducted on a wider range of periods and with different model
such as GARCH. Looking at a trading range alone is insufficient because it
takes no account of price fluctuations between the high and the low, while
variance around a long run mean could be misleading when prices contain
a trend. GARCH models are appropriate to be of used since they are capable
of capturing the three most empirical features observed in stock return data:
leptokurtosis, skewness and volatility clustering (Taufiq 1996).
ii) Relative Volatility Between Futures And Stock Markets
Inter-market comparison shows futures market volatility is higher. The
conclusions are the same when volatility is measured by both method. The
result is consistent with earlier studies in other countries.
The interpretation for the higher futures volatility are (i) “noise traders”
are more active in the futures market, so temporary price swings are
exaggerated by Black (1986). (ii) The future contract prices react more
quickly to new information because the contract has lower transaction costs
and (iii) they price the bundle of underlying stock simultaneously. Amihud
and Mendelson (1989) conclude that both these explanations contribute to
the higher volatility of futures returns.
iii) Futures Expiration Day Effect
The test shows no evidence of increase stock market volatility on futures
expiration days. This could be due to the KLCI futures contracts settlement
prices are calculated based on the average value of the stock index for the
last half hour of the trading, that is from 4.45pm to 5.15pm. This is
consistent with studied conducted by Bacha and Villa (1993), Stoll and
Whaley (1987) and Karakullukcu (1992).
The size of the futures market is estimated to be 25% of the stock
market Ringgit volume. The relative size is still small and not significant.
So, the no evidence of an expiration day effect should not be surprising
given the perspective of size.
iv) Futures Mispricing
The test of the mispricing shows frequent mispricing. There appears to be
much more underpricing (64%) than overpricing before the start of financial
crisis. This is in contrast to the early research by Yau et.al (1990) on
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S&P500 futures contract whose prices were constantly at a premium.
Furthermore, overpricing appears to be of a lower magnitude. There appears
to be stretches of very little or no overpricing (i.e. March to September
1996). The result also shows mispricing is larger in the later period of the
study. This  contradict with the findings by Brenner et al. (1989) and Bacha
and Fremault (1993) which show reduced mispricing over time. If one
ignored the currency crisis starting from July 1997, there clearly is no
declining trend in mispricing over the one and the half year period before
crisis. If transaction cost is taken into accounts, the result exhibit less
mispricing.
While transaction costs would affect arbitrageable opportunities on both
over and underpricing. We believe that this has partly to do with the
regulatory framework. In essence, the regulation is biased against Reverse
Cash and Carry arbitrage. In Malaysia, short selling is prohibited. When a
contract is underpriced, the index arbitrage strategy would be to long futures
and short the underlying stocks, but the regulatory framework is against this.
However, when futures are overpriced, there is no regulations preventing
whosoever to go short futures and long stocks. We believe the short selling
regulation is the major reason for the underpricing.
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